Governing Common Pool Resources in Fragile Political Systems: Modelling Behaviour, Institutions, and Social-Ecological Dynamics

Groundwater user groups in Tunisia face severe collective action problems. Aquifer depletion leads to empty wells and farmers’ unwillingness to pay water fees leads to bankrupt user groups – both disastrous for the many communities that rely on irrigation agriculture for their livelihoods. What conditions or combination of conditions drive water user behaviour in a system that is governed by institutional uncertainty and bounded rationality? What conditions or interventions are effective in avoiding or delaying system collapse? What is the role of social norms, particularly trust and leadership, in overcoming collective action problems? Based on and expanding on the theory of common pool resource governance, this paper ties institutional results to environmental outcomes. The complex common-pool resource system studied here is simulated by an Agent-Based Model (ABM) of groundwater user decision-making. This systematic coupling of social and biophysical data and models offers new insights into simulating dynamic interactions between human behaviour, social norms, and the underlying resource. The project aims to provide a guideline for alternative modes of policy-making and implementation to address the main water governance challenge in Tunisia, i.e. groundwater overexploitation.