Experiences and perspectives for the design evaluation of Konrad containers

The former iron ore mine Konrad near Salzgitter is the approved final repository for radioactive waste with negligible heat production in Germany and should go into operation in the 2030s. The waste comes from operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as from medicine, research and industry using radiation sources or radioactive materials. These types of waste are comparable to international low- and certain types of intermediate-level waste. The waste includes a large variety of products, materials and properties. The containers for such waste have the primary purpose of enabling handling and storing of the waste by safely enclosing the radioactive inventory and shielding of radiation. Due to the large variety of waste forms to be disposed of in the Konrad repository, different container types are specified to account for the different requirements related to each waste type.

Each container design for waste disposal in Konrad has to be approved by BGE on the basis of the “final disposal conditions” (Endlagerungsbedingungen) and the respective “product control” (Produktkontrolle). For demonstrating the container’s compliance with the regulatory framework, the waste producers or container manufacturers have to apply for design approval on the basis of a comprehensive safety assessment including all relevant reports about analytical, numerical and experimental safety demonstrations and quality assurance measures for container manufacturing and operation. Usually, BGE commissions independent experts like BAM to evaluate these documents and the design testing (e.g. drop or fire tests).

While the basic assessment principle is to verify the container design and quality to be in line with all regulatory requirements, there are often challenges associated with the container’s safety evaluation. As containers of different types have already been produced in large numbers and partially loaded with waste before the regulatory framework became effective (so-called “old” containers), they are considered in the regulations as well and safety assessments have to be provided in an equivalent way. As the requirements for the documentation of manufacturing quality were not yet known at the time these containers were manufactured, this is often challenging in practice. On the other hand, containers requiring the highest safety level (ABK II, sf) due to their nuclear content sometimes cause significant challenges and very long approval processes concerning safety demonstrations for severe accidental conditions like a 5 m drop without impact limiter onto a nearly unyielding target or a one hour 800 °C fire scenario. Furthermore, as the regulatory framework has not been updated for several decades, some requirements and the respective safety assessment methods have to be interpreted under consideration of the current state of knowledge in science and technology.