Dynamics of collective action to conserve a large common-pool resource

A pressing challenge in the Anthropocene is sustainable and just management of large-scale common-pool resources (CPRs) including the atmosphere, biodiversity and public services. This poses a difficult collective action problem because such resources may not show signs that usage restraint is needed until tragedy is almost inevitable. To solve this problem, a sufficient level of cooperation with a pro-conservation behavioural norm must be achieved, within the prevailing sociopolitical environment, in time for the action taken to be effective. In this work, we investigate the transient, nonequilibrium dynamics of behavioural change in an agent-based model on structured networks that are also exposed to a global external influence. Our model combines elements of rational choice theory with psychology-based opinion dynamics to reflect that individuals who promote collective action to conserve a large CPR are rationally motivated and also face psychosocial constraints. We find that social polarisation emerges naturally, even without assuming bounded confidence, but that for rationally motivated agents, it is temporary. The speed of convergence to a final consensus is controlled by the rate at which the polarised clusters are dissolved. This depends strongly on the combination of external influences and the network topology. Both high connectivity and a favourable environment are needed to rapidly obtain final consensus. Our findings expand the evidence that designing systems to encourage constructive engagement between disagreeing groups could be a powerful promoter of large-scale collective action.