The politics of natural disaster responses

The increasing frequency of natural disasters due to climate change has intensified pressures on societal well-being. In such times, understanding the institutional features that enable efficient, objective, and neutral disaster recovery is crucial. Recent studies have highlighted the severity of government oversight in disaster relief, often favoring co-partisan groups in developing and clientelistic countries. Disaster recovery systems are particularly vulnerable to the politics of post-disaster fund allocation. However, scholars have suggested that institutional design can counteract these dynamics, with France's mandatory disaster insurance system frequently cited as a model. In this study, we assess the extent to which France's mandatory disaster insurance system has been manipulated for electoral gain during presidential and munipal elections. Utilizing data from the CatNat national repository and municipal elections from 1980 to 2024, we employ a regression discontinuity design to examine how partisanship alignment between local and national governments affects both the demand and the supply side of disaster recognition and the response time. Our preliminary findings indicate that partisan alignment correlates with a higher demand for disaster recognition. However, the French institutional system appears effective in mitigating political distortions, as we find no significant evidence of partisanship influencing disaster relief. This article sheds light on the effectiveness of institutional design in reducing political distortions during the disaster recovery phase.