Water resources allocation in a transregional river based on a dynamic Rubinstein Bargaining Model

The artificial division of administrate regions makes the same river flow through different administrative regions, and water conflicts appear when water resources are insufficient to meet the demands claimed by stakeholders along the transregional rivers. Transregional water resources allocation has become an important means to solve transregional water conflicts. The Rubinstein bargaining model has been successfully applied in solving water conflicts due to its ability to reflect the bargaining power of various stakeholders. However, the above mentioned Rubinstein bargaining model treats the discount factors of various stakeholders with a single fixed value, ignoring the impact of dynamic changes in the discount factor the uncertainty of water resources allocation results caused by the unavoidable incoming water forecast error, which may lead to the imbalance of water resources supply and demand in the actual water resources allocation. this paper proposes a multi-agent Rubinstein bargaining water resource allocation model that considers the forecast error based on the dynamic change of the discount factor. Firstly, This paper establishes a Rubinstein bargaining stochastic model considering the dynamic change of the discount factor and the error of the incoming water forecast; secondly, this paper analyzes the impact of the bargaining rounds, the degree of deviation, the adjustment coefficients on the discount factor, and carries out a comparative study on the Rubinstein bargaining model based on the dynamic and the fixed-value discount factor; Then, this paper investigates the uncertainty of various stakeholder allocation results and the response regularity to the total water resource uncertainty. Finally, seven administrative regions in the Ganjiang River Basin of China were selected as the research subjects. The results show the following: (a) compare with Rubinstein bargaining model based on fixed discount factor, the proposed model based on dynamic discount factor can advance the negotiation round, lower the negotiation, and better balance the economic and social development level among various stakeholders. (b) the water allocated to the seven regions has a normal distribution when inflow forecasting error obeys the normal distribution. (c) The mean and standard deviation of the allocation results have a good relationship with the mean and standard deviation of forecast water resource, thus aiding the stakeholders in making decisions and improving the practical value of the method.